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Abstract 
 
Non-execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is a 
matter of serious concern. In order to address it, the reasons for and dynamics 
of non-execution need to be fully considered. This paper engages with non-
execution by sketching the underpinning issues that help to explain it and, we 
argue, must shape our responses to it. Through this engagement, we conclude 
that non-execution is properly understood as a phenomenon that requires 
political rather than legal responses. This calls into question the usefulness of 
the infringement proceedings contained in Article 46(4) of the Convention 
and which it has recently been suggested ought to be embraced in attempts to 
address non-execution. Arguing that, even if the practical difficulties of 
triggering Article 46(4) proceedings could somehow be overcome, the 
dynamics of non-execution suggest that such proceedings would be both 
futile and counter-productive, likely to lead to backlash against the Court and 
unlikely to improve states’ execution of its judgments.  
 
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, 
Legitimacy, Execution of Judgments, Law Reform, Infringement Proceedings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court) are 
expressly binding on the parties to which they are addressed,
2
 and are generally complied 
with,
3
 they are not always executed by the Contracting Parties; a state of affairs that causes 
some considerable unrest. It has recently been suggested that non-execution might effectively 
be addressed through the use of Article 46(4): the infringement proceeding within the 
Convention.
4
 Were this recommendation to be embraced, it would be a significant shift in 
attempts to secure execution under the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR or 
the Convention), from the political to the judicial.  
While we accept the worrying nature of non-execution for both the Court and the 
protection of rights in Europe more broadly, and share widespread concern about non-
execution, we caution against the use of Article 46(4) ECHR as a response to non-execution.
5
 
This caution emanates from a simple concern that the infringement procedure in Article 46(4) 
is an ill-suited ‘solution’ to a real, but ultimately political, problem.6 While this paper most 
directly addresses the (un)suitability of Article 46(4) to address non-execution, its broader 
point—that non-execution cannot be properly addressed unless we understand its nature and 
implications—is of wider application in debates about execution.  
Thus, we begin by making clear what is at stake in non-execution, stressing the 
implications for both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Convention system. Then, 
having outlined the working of the system at present and the nature of the cases before the 
Committee of Ministers, we turn to considering the dynamics and nature of non-execution. 
Here we make clear that not all cases of non-execution are the same; rather, we claim that 
some can be said to emanate from principle, and others from dilatoriness.
7
 This is not to 
suggest that some are ‘more’ worrying than others, but rather to illustrate the point that non-
execution is a complex and polycentric problem likely to withstand ‘simple’ solutions.  
Having thus ‘set up’ the problem of non-execution we move to consider the proposed 
solution. We argue that it fails to account for the nature and dynamics of non-execution, and 
                                                        
2
 Art 46(1) ECHR. 
3
 According to the annual report for 2015 the Committee of Ministers has closed 1537 cases that have been 
executed by the Contracting Parties. During the same year only 1285 cases were received for execution. There is 
a major backlog of cases (over 10,000) but the tendency is positive. Moreover, not all of these cases are 
problematic in terms of execution; some of them simply require time to be implemented, but do not attract any 
dispute as to execution from the State in question. See more in ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 9th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers.’, 
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4
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5
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Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) has acknowledged that ‘[t]he implementation of some judgments is 
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7
 The members of the Steering Committee for Human Rights came to a similar conclusion that non-execution is 
caused by either political reasons of the reasons of complexity of execution. ibid para 134-135. Although we 
acknowledge that some delays in execution can be caused by complexity of the measures that should be adopted 
by the Contracting Parties a really challenging aspect of execution is when the Contracting Parties do not put 
efforts into execution regardless of whether the measures are complex or less so. Therefore, categorisation of 
non-execution below into principled non-execution and dilatoriness is more appropriate for the purposes of this 
paper. 
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that Article 46(4) cannot effectively address non-execution. Instead, it is our contention that 
relying on infringement proceedings would both further overburden the Court and exacerbate 
some of the tensions about international judicial supervision that underpin non-execution in 
the first place. It would, thus, be a counter-productive and ultimately unsuccessful approach 
to addressing the serious problem of non-execution; a problem, we claim, that is properly 
construed as political rather than legal. 
 
II. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF NON-EXECUTION 
 
Quite beyond the (not insignificant) fact that an unexecuted judgment means that serious 
rights violations remain unaddressed in a Contracting Party to the Convention, non-execution 
raises concerns as to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ECtHR and, indeed, the 
interaction between the two.
8
Although effectiveness (in the sense of achieving established 
objectives) and legitimacy are not necessarily synonymous, it is true that the effectiveness of 
a system can point to its perceived legitimacy on the part of relevant stakeholders. In other 
words, it can suggest that the system in question ‘works’ because it is perceived as legitimate 
in terms of input, output, and outcome (or a combination of the three).
9
 In a relatively 
straightforward if somewhat simplistic sense, the aim of the Court is to resolve disputes as to 
alleged rights violations by producing authoritative judgments that are routinely executed by 
the Contracting Parties. Should judgments remain un-executed, the Court will not have 
effectively interpreted, adjudicated upon, and ensured compliance with rights as protected by 
the Convention.  
Quite beyond the instinctive general statement that routine execution may point to 
perceived legitimacy, it is possible to articulate two particular legitimacy implications of non-
execution. First, perceived illegitimacy on the part of the Court may result in its judgments 
themselves being seen as illegitimate. This in turn can underpin a (political) claim from a 
Contracting Party that a judgment need not be executed, notwithstanding the clear legal 
obligation to do so. As further considered below, the UK’s non-execution seems to rest on 
such an implicit (and sometimes explicit) (il)legitimacy claim, namely that the Court is 
interpreting the Convention beyond its original intended meaning to an extent that exceeds 
the original consent of States (i.e. is exercising judicial power illegitimately) and is failing to 
take proper account of domestic judicial and democratic processes of decision-making in 
respect of these kinds of rights disputes (i.e. is not respecting its subsidiarity and thus is 
acting illegitimately). Thus, this claim relates to both input and output legitimacy as 
commonly understood.  
The second connection between ineffectiveness of execution and legitimacy relates to 
outcome legitimacy: an ineffective Court cannot protect rights properly (i.e. by ensuring 
remedial action at individual and/or systemic levels in the Contracting Party) thus, while its 
process and outcome (judging and judgment) might be seen as legitimate, institutional 
legitimacy might be diminished by the sense that the Court simply ‘does not work’. This is 
notwithstanding that fact that in the context of the ECHR this is more accurately stated as 
‘the system does not work to effectively protect rights’ where the system comprises 
                                                        
8
 See, H Keller and C Marti, ‘Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2015) 26 EJIL 829, 830; C Hillebrecht, ‘Rethinking 
Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights 
Tribunals’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 362. 
9
 On the interaction of these elements in theories of democratic legitimacy see, for example, Y Chistyakova, 
‘Democratic Legitimacy, Effectiveness, and the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures’, in F de Londras 
and J Doody (eds), The Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism (Routledge 2015) 114.  
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Contracting Parties (that violate rights), the Committee of Ministers (that fails to ensure 
execution), and the Court (whose judgment is not executed).  
Bearing all of this in mind, it is apposite to note that, in fact, the ECtHR enjoys a high 
level of compliance with its judgments when compared with other regional or global human 
rights tribunals.
10
 However, non-execution is a persistent challenge. Before exploring the 
system for supervising execution and the dynamics of non-execution, it is useful to consider 
the types of cases under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. In doing so, some 
simplification is necessary, but bearing this in mind these cases can be divided into three 
broadly-drawn types, determined by the stage of execution, and the sensitivity and resource 
implications of the cases. These are ‘simple’ cases, resource-intensive cases, and politically 
sensitive cases. As will readily be seen, the real challenge of non-execution relates to cases 
that fall into the latter categories. 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recognises that some cases are 
‘simple’ and thus that its limited resources should not be primarily spent on these cases. Here 
‘simple’ does not refer to the facts of the case or the complexity of the reasoning but purely 
refers to the execution measures. This is reflected in the working methods of the Committee 
of Ministers. In 2011, supervisory procedures were divided into two broad categories: 
standard supervision and enhanced supervision.
11
 Most if not all cases that we call ‘simple’ 
would fall under standard supervision. In contrast, the enhanced procedure is used where the 
Committee of Ministers or the Court has identified a structural or complex problem, as well 
as those cases in which urgent individual measures are required, i.e. for resource-intensive 
and politically sensitive cases in the main. Moreover cases that at first fall into the category 
of ‘simple’ and are thus under standard supervision may be escalated into enhanced 
supervision as the matter of execution becomes complex for political, economic, or other 
reasons.
12
 
The majority of the cases currently under review before the Committee of Ministers 
can be classified as ‘simple’. These cases are unproblematic and can be resolved through 
‘normal’ bureaucratic procedures. Almost all Contracting Parties have created an 
infrastructure through which simple cases are executed by legislative or administrative 
change or payment of just satisfaction. These cases are, thus, not a matter of great concern 
and are not the subject of execution-related anxiety within the Council of Europe. 
The second type of cases under review before the Committee of Ministers relates to 
judgments the execution of which would be very resource intensive. For example they 
concern a large number of applications, require the introduction of major reforms in the 
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 About 60 per cent of all leading cases are executed in under 5 year of which more than 20 per cent are 
executed within 2 years. ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 9th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers’ (n 3) 75. Although similar statistics are not 
available for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), it has been pointed out that the compliance 
rate with their judgments is not particularly high. See, for example, S Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics. 
A Theory of National and International Courts (Cambridge University Press 2015) 55; L Burgorgue Larsen and 
A Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Law and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 213. 
11
 ‘Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 8 th 
Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers (2014)’. 
<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2014_en.pdf>28; see also, Keller 
and Marti (n 8) 830 
12
 ‘Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 
implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan – Modalities for a twin-track supervision system, 
CM/Inf/DH(2010)37 (6 September 2010)’ 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804a3
27f>. 
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Contracting Party, or simply oblige the Contracting Party to pay significant sums of just 
satisfaction.
13
 
The third type of case under review before the Committee of Ministers relates to 
judgments the execution of which require political decisions in sensitive areas within 
domestic politics, including (but not limited to) those that might carry negative consequences 
for the ruling elites in the respondent state. ‘Political decisions’ here include legislative 
changes or changes of legal and politico-legal practice in the Contracting Party. Of course, 
many such cases are executed (consider, for example, the introduction of the Protection of 
Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 in Ireland by means of execution of A, B &C v Ireland
14
), 
however that is by no means always the case (for example the prisoner voting cases against 
the UK
15
 and LGBTQi equality cases in Russia
16
).  
The persistent concerns about non-execution in the Council of Europe relate, 
primarily, to cases that we might say fall into Types 2 and 3 here, i.e. cases the execution of 
which would be resource intensive and/or relates to a matter of domestic political sensitivity. 
These, in turn, tend to be cases the non-execution of which is likely to be motivated by either 
principle or dilatoriness.  
 
III. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS: THE CONVENTION SYSTEM 
 
Unlike many other human rights judicial institutions
17
 the Court has a well-established 
mechanism for supervising the execution of its judgments, with primary responsibility resting 
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 The group of cases that followed the pilot judgment in Ivanov v Ukraine, Application No 40450/04, Judgment 
of 15 October 2009 is an example of such situation. This case concerned violations of Art 6 and 13 ECHR when 
final judgments of Ukrainian national courts could not be executed. This relates to a large number of cases, the 
resolution of which would put extra pressure on the already stretched budget of Ukraine. Although the 
Ukrainian authorities have adopted a legal remedy that is supposed to fix the systemic problem of non-execution 
of final judgments of national courts (the law ‘On State guarantees concerning enforcement of judicial 
decisions’, which entered into force on 1 January 2013). the real challenge here is the lack of resources to pay 
compensation for delays in the execution of thousands of judgments. According to information available to the 
Committee of ministers 26,835 writs of execution for a total amount of 865.45 million UAH (slightly less than 
€30,000,000) are still pending enforcement. ‘Current State of Execution of Pending Case Zhovner v Ukraine’ 
<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=zhovner&State
Code=UKR&SectionCode>. Taking into account that Ukraine is in turmoil, fighting hyperinflation, military 
aggression and internal instability, it seems to be highly unlikely that the authorities will reallocate resources to 
comply with the judgment of the Strasbourg Court. 
14
 A, B and C v Ireland, Application No 25579/05, Judgment of 16 December 2010. 
15
 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2), Application No 74025/01, Judgment of 6 October 2005; Greens and MT v 
the United Kingdom, Applications No. 60041/08 and 60054/08, Judgment of 23 November 2010. 
16
 Alekseyev v Russia, Applications No. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, Judgment of 10 October 2010. 
17
 Although one cannot say that for instance the IACtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee do not have any 
supervisory mechanism of compliance with their decisions, their mechanisms are fundamentally different to the 
one provided by the ECHR. In case of the Inter-American system, the IACtHR itself can monitor compliance 
with its judgments. See Burgorgue Larsen and Ubeda de Torres (n 10) 178. The IACtHR and the Inter-
American Commission ‘have been authorized to speak before the General Assembly, but this does not give rise 
to any real political debate worthy of the name between the Sates…’ ibid 180. In assuming competence to 
supervise compliance with its own judgments, the IACtHR has expressly distinguished the Inter-American 
system from the Strasbourg system. The IACtHR stated that ‘[u]nlike the inter-American system for the 
protection of human rights, in the European system, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has 
adopted norms that clearly establish the procedure that this body should use for monitoring compliance with the 
judgments of the Court.  Unlike the procedure in the inter-American protection system, the Committee of 
Ministers is the political body to which the responsible States submit their reports on the measures adopted to 
execute judgments. The American Convention does not establish a specific body responsible for monitoring 
compliance with the judgments delivered by the Court, as provided for in the European Convention. When the 
American Convention was drafted, the model adopted by the European Convention was followed as regards 
competent bodies and institutional mechanisms; however, it is clear that, when regulating monitoring 
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with the Committee of Minsters. Before outlining how the system currently works, however, 
it is germane to pause for a moment on the deceptively complex concept of ‘execution’. In 
relatively simple terms, we might say that ‘execution’ means ‘giving effect to the remedy as 
ordered in the judgment’. However, the multiplicity of remedial forms in the ECtHR means 
that there are at least three levels of execution for many judgments: just satisfaction, 
individual measures, and general measures.  
Just satisfaction is usually straightforward. Article 41 ECHR allows for the Court to 
award just satisfaction where there has been a violation, the domestic law of the respondent 
State ‘allows only partial reparation to be made’, and the Court considers an award of just 
satisfaction to be necessary.
18
 In many individual applications and in some inter-State cases
19
 
the Court awards just satisfaction which covers pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that 
should normally be paid by the respondent State within three months of the entry into force 
of the judgment. Whether or not the just satisfaction element of a judgment has been 
executed is a simple matter of determining whether the awarded sum has actually been paid 
to the successful applicant.
20
  
The second level of execution of judgments is that of individual measures. These are 
designed ‘to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured party is put, as far as 
possible, in the same situation as they were in prior to the violation of the Convention’.21 The 
Contracting Parties are obliged to comply with individual measures,
22
 although they are only 
likely to arise in cases where restitution of rights by such a measure is deemed possible and 
appropriate, such as in Volkov v Ukraine
23
 where the Court ordered reinstatement of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
compliance with the judgments of the Inter-American Court, it was not envisaged that the OAS General 
Assembly or the OAS Permanent Council would carry out a similar function to the Committee of Ministers in 
the European system’. Baena-Ricardo et al v Panama, Series C No. 104, judgment of 28 November 2003, para 
87-8. 
18
 On the working of Art 41 ECHR see, for example, D Harris, M O’Boyle, E Bates and C Buckley, Harris, 
O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 
155-62. 
19
 Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction), Application No 25781/94, Decision of 12 May 2014. 
20
 There are some complex elements of payment, such as whether interest has been paid, or whether the payment 
has been made by the correct date. It is also the case that in some cases, such as Loizidou v Turkey, Application 
no. 15318/89, Judgment of 18 December 1996, payment is a matter of principle, which may add a further layer 
of complexity and indeed the payments in that case are now under enhanced supervision procedures. This is 
because, ‘the Turkish authorities have not complied with their obligation to pay the amounts awarded by the 
Court to the applicants in those cases, as well as in 32 other cases in the Xenides-Arestis group, on the grounds 
that this payment cannot be dissociated from the measures of substance in these cases’ (‘Status of Execution, 
Xenides-Arestis v Turkey, Application no. 46347/99, Judgment of 22 December 2005’ < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=Xenides-
Arestis&StateCode=TUR&SectionCode>). However as a general matter determining whether or not payment 
has been made in full and on time is a ‘simple’ or straightforward matter. 
21
 ‘Appendix 4 (Item 4.4) Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the Supervision of the Execution of 
Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements. Rule 6, Section 2’, 
<www.wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=999329>. 
22
 In Scozzari and Giunta v Italy the ECtHR has emphasized that ‘by Article 46 of the Convention the High 
Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they were 
parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in 
which the Court finds a breach imposes on the  respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those 
concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the 
Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic 
legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects’. 
Scozzari and Giunta v Italy, Application no. 39221/98 and 41963/98, Judgment of 13 July 2000, para 249. 
23
 Volkov v Ukraine, Application no. 21722/11, Judgment of 27 May 2013. On compliance with the remedy see 
‘Oleksandr Volkov Reinstated as Supreme Court Judge in Ukraine’ (EHRAC web page, 2 February 2015 
<www.ehrac.org.uk/news/oleksandr-volkov-reinstated-as-supreme-court-judge-in-ukraine/>. 
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applicant to his post as a judge of the Supreme Court. In such cases, determining compliance 
with individual measures is also quite straightforward.  
Finally, there are general measures which are ‘adopted …[to] prevent … new 
violations similar to that or those found or [to] put… an end to continuing violations’.24 Such 
measures require substantial change at a systemic level, and in some cases these are the only 
remedy ordered (for example, in Hirst No 2
25
). General measures can be particularly 
challenging from the perspective of determining whether execution has taken place as here 
the question of execution is one of interpreting whether what the State has done is sufficient 
to constitute the general measure that was ordered.  
In recognition of the complexity of supervising execution, Protocol 14 introduced a 
procedure by which the Committee of Ministers could refer a case back to the Court for 
clarificatory interpretation of what the judgment requires by means of execution (i.e. Article 
46(3) ECHR). One can imagine that in complex cases (perhaps especially relating to general 
measures) such a decision on interpretation might clarify the intention of the Court and 
simplify the matter of determining whether a judgment has been executed or not. Thus, it has 
the potential to enhance collaboration between the Court, the Committee of Ministers, and the 
Contracting Parties in ensuring execution. However, as Article 46(3) ECHR still awaits its 
debut before the Court its usefulness is not yet clear. 
 
IV. THE REASONS FOR NON-EXECUTION 
 
It is essential that any attempt to seriously address non-execution would recognise the 
dynamics and reasons for non-execution. It is only once the root causes have been identified 
and considered that solutions can be devised or, indeed, that the insoluble nature of some 
challenges can be recognised. Thus, we propose here that non-simple non-execution can be 
broadly said to fall into two categories: principled non-execution and dilatory non-execution. 
The former can be said to relate to cases where states refuse to execute because of a deep-
seated disagreement not only with the outcome but, perhaps more significantly, with the 
principle of an international court’s decision ‘overturning’ a domestic, democratically arrived 
at position in respect of a particular matter. There are very few instances of this type of non-
execution, which is ultimately related to the fact disagreement about human rights and about 
the meaning of a human rights treaty is possible, even when parties truly believe in and are 
committed to the protection of human rights.
26
 The latter relate to cases where States are 
generally dilatory in their execution of adverse judgments from the Court, so that individual 
cases of non-execution might be connected to this general pattern of resistance to giving 
effect to the outcome of international judicial supervision in the area of rights. The vast 
majority of cases of non-execution would fall into this broadly defined category. Importantly, 
the same State might well be a principled non-executor in some cases and a dilatory one in 
others. These two (very broadly conceived) categories are not the same, although both pose 
challenges for the Court. Thus, they merit some further consideration at this stage. 
 
A. Principled Non-Execution 
 
                                                        
24
 Appendix 4 (Item 4.4) Rules of the Committee of Ministers (n 21), Rule 6, Section 2.  
25
 The Court stated that ‘it will be for the United Kingdom Government in due course to implement such 
measures as it considers appropriate to fulfil its obligations to secure the right to vote in compliance with this 
judgment. In the circumstances, it considers that this may be regarded as providing the applicant with just 
satisfaction for the breach in this case’. Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) (n 15), para 93. 
26
 See J Waldron, 'The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review' (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346. 
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In at least some cases, States may refuse to execute a judgment on ‘principled’ grounds, 
where the principle at stake is not one of rights protection per se but rather relates to the 
perceived appropriate division of authority between domestic and international organs,
27
 
which division might be pre-determined by the constitutional arrangement in the Contracting 
Party. For example, the German Constitutional Court has declared as a matter of principle 
that the German Constitution would prevail in situations of conflict between it and a 
judgment of the ECtHR.
28
 The Russian Constitutional Court has taken a similar approach 
(now also supported by domestic legislation considered below), and the Italian Constitutional 
Court has at least intimated its inclination towards a similar position.
29
 This suggests that if a 
judgment of the ECtHR is in direct conflict with the domestic constitutional text or norm, it 
may not be executed as a matter of principle.  
Of course, the mere fact that this emanates from principle does not rid it of its deeply 
problematic nature. Such an approach both creates a situation in which an international 
obligation is not complied with and the State finds itself either in violation of the Convention 
(by failing to execute) or experiencing domestic constitutional tensions (through the 
government’s response to the judgment of a national constitutional court if it is inclined to 
execute the Strasbourg judgment). Not only that but, of course, prioritising the national 
constitutional order over a binding judgment of an international court applying an 
international treaty to which the State is a Contracting Party exposes the deep and ultimately 
unresolved tensions between international and domestic law. Unless the legal system in 
question determines to the contrary (e.g. in relation to the supremacy of EU law), national 
constitutions usually enjoy legal supremacy within the domestic legal order. Ultimately, non-
execution of cases in such a situation calls attention to the fact that this tension has not been 
effectively resolved. In situations where the meaning or application of a certain right, 
protected by law, is the subject of good faith dispute, principled contestation is possible. In 
such cases, domestic actors may not be convinced of the determinative decisional authority of 
the supra-national court even where the State in question is generally committed to rights, 
internationalist, and compliant with adverse judgments from the supra-national court. This 
tension is not necessarily only between domestic and supra-national courts; it may also (or 
otherwise) be between domestic parliament and supra-national court, especially where the 
domestic parliament has a recognised role in determining constitutional and quasi-
constitutional norms in the domestic legal system as, for example, in the United Kingdom. 
The UK is a high compliance State whose posture in respect of the ECtHR is of 
general significance: as we have previously written, ‘the Court has rather a lot to lose 
if…high-compliance State…begin to withdraw support and/or seriously question its 
legitimacy….a discourse of illegitimacy might emerge that has the potential to destabilise the 
Court and set the conditions for selective non-compliance even by high compliance States’.30 
In this context, the standoff between the United Kingdom and the Court for example as 
regards prisoner voting rights
31
 is a matter of some considerable concern: while the UK does 
not generally refuse to execute adverse judgments against it, its non-execution of the prisoner 
voting judgments poses a significant challenge for the Convention system.  
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It is not necessary, here, to rehearse in detail the well-known facts of the prisoner 
voting cases,
32
 in which the Court established that the blanket ban preventing all convicted 
prisoners in the United Kingdom from voting violates Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the 
Convention. It is clear that the United Kingdom government vehemently disagrees with the 
idea that imprisonment should not result in an automatic and blanket ban on voting; the ban 
had been debated and approved relatively recently when the Court made its decision and, in 
spite of a process of ‘reflection’ and consideration of possible reforms33 since Hirst, the 
status quo ante remains in place. To understand this standoff one must return to a 
fundamental principle of UK constitutional law: the sovereignty of Parliament and its ability 
to decide complex matters of internal politics, including human rights. Parliament has 
considered the matter, including the rights-related issues, and has decided that a blanket ban 
is appropriate. Within the UK constitutional context, a court should not disturb that decision, 
except, perhaps, in exceptional situations. Thus, for example, even if a domestic court 
considered this to be incompatible with the Convention as implemented through the 
Human Rights Act 1998, it could not strike it down; rather it would make a declaration 
of incompatibility (which Parliament could act on or not and which would not disturb 
the validity of the law),34 or it would ‘interpret’ the law in a manner that made it human 
rights compatible,35 following which Parliament could explicitly amend the law to 
return it to its original effect thus signifying its clear intent. It is, perhaps, little surprise 
then that these cases have elicited such a response that the prisoner voting ban has 
arguably become more entrenched in the past decade; the refusal to be ‘dictated to’ by 
Strasbourg on something on which Westminster had already made a decision appears to be a 
strongly held point of principle, (so much so that then-Prime Minister, David Cameron, has 
said that the thought of prisoners having a right to vote makes him ‘physically ill’36 ). 
Democratic participation for imprisoned criminals ‘damn well shouldn’t’ be allowed to 
happen, the former Prime Minister said.
37
 If the Court thinks otherwise, it seems, ‘we need to 
clip its wings’.38 And although the UK government has never officially declared that it is not 
going to execute the judgment in Hirst No 2 before the Committee of Ministers in Strasbourg, 
the rhetoric of legislative and executive bodies and a clear lack of progress show that the UK 
is involved in principled non-execution. 
When these cases are seen as relating solely to a straightforward question of whether 
incarcerated persons can vote per se, the strength and depth of the conviction of the 
government (and many others in the UK) may seem baffling. However the standoff between 
the UK and the Court in respect of prisoner voting, which manifests itself in a refusal to 
execute the relevant judgments, is not really about prisoner voting: it is about fundamental 
disagreements between the United Kingdom and the Court about the role and nature of 
human rights and about the judicial function. In the British constitutional tradition it is 
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ultimately politics that is said to determine the constitution, not courts, and that deep-seated 
constitutional tradition inevitably struggles with a strong judiciary.
39
 While a muscular 
European judiciary might have led to some discontent in the past, the Human Rights Act 
1998 has brought that muscularity ‘home’ 40  together with the rights protected by the 
Convention; it has caused a constitutional disruption of substantial proportions. The ECtHR 
has been dynamic, sometimes provocative, and often expansionist for quite some time, but 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 that can no longer be ignored or left to the international 
sphere within a classically dualist construction. Rather, it flows into every Magistrates’ Court 
and public authority in the United Kingdom.
41
 Thus, the UK’s non-execution of these cases, 
while of course problematic, can be said to be principled. As a phenomenon it is polycentric 
with roots in British constitutional culture, governmental frustration, the cut and thrust of 
constitutional change in the United Kingdom, and institutional jealousy all of which are 
mapped onto frustrations with the ECtHR and come together to form a rhetorically powerful 
claim of illegitimacy in Strasbourg.  
Given its status as a norm entrepreneur
42
 within the Convention system, it is perhaps 
to be expected that the prisoner-voting saga has resonance well beyond the UK itself. The 
clearest example is that of Russia, which, appearing to be emboldened by the UK’s stance, 
has introduced a law that allows the Constitutional Court to declare rulings from international 
human rights courts, including the ECtHR, non-executable in Russia due to their 
incompatibility with the Constitution of Russia. The Venice Commission has already 
descried this law as ‘incompatible with international law’,43 and given the very high volume 
of cases brought to the Court concerning Russia,
44
 and their relatively high success rate
45—
not to mention Russia’s extensive non-execution problem—it is difficult to reach any 
conclusion other than that this law is intended to provide the appearance of a principled non-
execution (along the lines of the UK’s), not least because the law allows the Court to 
disregard such judgments to ‘protect the interests of Russia’.46 The appearance of principled 
non-execution is also emphasised by the fact that it was the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v 
Russia,
47
 finding that a blanket ban on prisoners voting violates the Convention, that was said 
to trigger the introduction of this law. Moreover, the Russian Constitutional Court has been 
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quick in utilising this law and claiming that the judgment in Anchugov and Gladkov cannot 
be fully executed.
48
  
 
B. Dilatoriness 
 
In contrast with what we have characterised as principled non-execution, is simple 
dilatoriness on the part of States. This accounts for by far the greatest proportion of 
problematic non-executed cases before the Court. In the report on the implementation of 
judgments, presented by Mr Klaas de Vries in September of 2015,
49
 the nine States in relation 
to which the non-execution problem is most acute are named as Italy, Turkey, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Romania, Greece, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.  
The major problems identified are strikingly similar across many of these States. 
These are problems—in all nine States—with the duration, re-opening and enforcement of 
judicial decisions and lack of effective remedy; unfair trials in Ukraine; the expulsion of 
foreign nationals in violation of the Convention in Italy, Russia and Bulgaria, and their 
detention in Greece; conditions of detention in Italy, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Greece, and 
Hungary (where the concerns reach ill-treatment levels); violations of freedom of expression, 
assembly and association in Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and Greece; excessive detention in 
Turkey and Russia; the behaviour of security forces in Turkey, Romania, Russia (where 
concerns as to torture and ill-treatment arise), Greece and Bulgaria (where the use of lethal 
force and deaths in custody arise); the treatment of Cypriots (in Turkey), Chechens (in 
Russia), and Roma (in Hungary); and failure to compensate for nationalisation in Romania. 
These are not problems that display any deep-seated politico-philosophical 
disagreements with the Court’s interpretation of a particular provision, or with the concept of 
international supervision per se. They are not, in other words, disputes as to principle. Rather 
here non-execution is a simple dilatory tactic and, in at least some cases, reveals deeply 
problematic attitudinal and/or organisational resistance to the idea of rights protection, to 
liberal democracy founded on rights and constitutionalism, and to judicial authority per se.
50
 
In others States this non-execution reflects a long-standing failure to organise the organs of 
the State and administration of State power in an effective, accountable, and rights-respecting 
way.
51
 There are problems here of corruption, autocracy, geopolitics, formal legality without 
commitment to the liberal construction of the Rule of Law, and systematic disregard for 
judicial authority and, in some cases, independence. The ECtHR had to develop a procedure 
of pilot judgments precisely because its judgments concerned with systemic problems were 
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not properly executed.
52
 While these are not problems of the ECtHR itself, they 
fundamentally undermine its capacity for the effective protection of rights in these countries. 
This can readily be seen by dwelling slightly on the example of Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan became a Contracting Party to the ECHR in 2002, and currently has 1589 
applications pending before the Court.
53
 Although it has long been in what might be 
described as “a pseudo-democratic condition”,54 there has been a notable and severe crack 
down on human rights defenders, opposition politicians, and the work of human rights 
lawyers in recent years, while at the same time the executive has acquired increasingly 
expansive powers and the judiciary continues to suffer from a lack of effective 
independence.
55
 The ECtHR has been critical in cases that have come before it. In 
Mammadov v Azerbaijan,
56
 for example, the Court found the arrest and detention of an 
opposition politician and political blogger, Ilgar Mammadov, to have violated Article 11 
(right to assembly). This is not the only time the Court has found Azerbaijan to have violated 
the Convention for arresting and detaining opposition politicians,
57
 while at the same time 
many NGOs in the country have been forced to close and the space for civil society activism 
and criticism is steadily shrinking.
58
 In this context of steady and deliberate repression, it is 
perhaps little surprise that Azerbaijan’s consistent non-execution of judgments, and general 
non-implementation of the Convention, has attracted concerted attention. The State has been 
criticised by the Committee of Ministers for its failure to execute individual judgments,
59
 and 
in late 2015 the Secretary General launched an inquiry into respect for human rights in the 
country. This was the first time that the power to launch an inquiry on national 
implementation of the Convention under Article 52 was used by Secretary General Thorbjørn 
Jagland. In spite of all of this, Azerbaijan continues in its non-execution of ECtHR judgments 
in a manner that is, clearly, dilatory, and reveals a complex story of repression and disrespect 
for rights within the country. 
 
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: ART 46(4) ECHR 
 
Although States are obliged to execute the judgments of the ECtHR that are addressed to 
them, how they do so has conventionally been considered to be largely a matter of State 
discretion.
60
 This is why the supervisory role of the Committee of Ministers is so important: 
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it is that body which decides whether or not the actions taken on the part of States are 
sufficient to constitute execution of the Court’s judgment.  
In 1998 the new ECtHR replaced a permanent Commission on Human Rights and a 
part-time ECtHR. This reform was in response to an increasing number of the Contracting 
Parties with a new set of human rights challenges and as a result of it an increased number of 
applications, which in turn led to a higher number of judgments. As a result the Committee of 
Ministers was exposed to a greater amount of non-executed judgments which it was supposed 
to supervise. By the time that Protocol 14 was being negotiated this challenge was quite 
evident. Protocol 14 was opened for ratification and signing in 2004. At that time, a clear 
trend of increasing numbers of pending cases before the Committee of Ministers could be 
observed, and this continued after the Protocol was opened for ratification. Between 1999 and 
2008 the number of pending judgments grew from 1607 to 7328.
61
 In 2010 when Protocol 14 
entered into force 9899 cases were pending before the Committee of Ministers; this number 
peaked in 2012 at 11099 and slightly decreased by 2015 (10652). Importantly between 1999 
and 2002 the number of pending cases then doubled.
62
 Protocol 14 was drafted in partial 
recognition of the view that ‘The Court’s authority and the system’s credibility both depend 
to a large extent on the effectiveness’63 of execution; the political failure to execute was 
damaging the Court, and something was to be done about it. In particular, there was concern 
that cases pointing to structural problems in the Contracting Parties were not being executed 
(i.e. cases the execution of which were resource intensive or politically sensitive), which in 
turn fed into the problem of repetitive applications before the Court.
64
 
Motivated by a desire to address this phenomenon, Protocol 14 introduced two new 
procedures, both of which involved the Court in the execution of judgments, an activity that 
was previously exclusively the domain of the political institutions of the Council of Europe 
and the Contracting Parties themselves. The first of these changes—in what is now Article 
46(3) ECHR—allows the Committee of Ministers to request the Court to interpret a judgment 
in order to better enable its supervision and was considered above. The second change—in 
what is now Article 46(4) ECHR—is altogether different. This allows the Committee of 
Minsters to bring infringement proceedings against a Contracting Party that has failed to 
execute the judgment, even after being served with a notice to comply by the Committee.  
The explanatory materials to this change make it clear that the new measures were 
motivated by a particular concern with non-execution of judgments that revealed (and 
required resolution of) structural issues in the State in question, and with the implications of 
non-execution for ‘the Convention system’s credibility and effectiveness’.65 The power was 
intended to give the Committee of Ministers an alternative, but still strong, instrument to use 
against recalcitrant States, so that suspension from the Council of Europe (the strongest 
sanction available and contained in Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe) would 
not be necessary. Suspension, it was thought, ‘would prove counter-productive in most 
cases’, whereas an Article 46(4) ECHR proceeding ‘add further possibilities of bringing 
pressure to bear’ and ‘should act as an effective incentive to execute the Court’s 
judgments’.66 
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It has been proposed that actually using Article 46(4) ECHR by the Committee of 
Ministers might go some way towards resolving this persistent challenge of non-execution.
67
 
However, we caution against adopting this proposal because, in our view, Article 46(4) 
ECHR is an ill-suited ‘solution’ to the true nature of the non-execution problem when it is 
understood in the manner outlined above and may, indeed, have negative implications for the 
Court should it be used to address either the ‘principled’ or ‘dilatory’ non-executing state.  
 
VI. AN ILL-SUITED SOLUTION 
 
Given the nature of the non-execution problem as we have outlined it above, we argue that 
Article 46(1) ECHR is an ill-suited solution on three main grounds: practicality, futility, and 
potential backlash. While the first of these—the objection of practicality—is a general 
concern with Article 46(4), the concerns of futility and possible backlash are clearly informed 
by a critical appreciation of the dynamics of non-execution as outlined above. Even if the 
practical shortcomings of Article 46(4) could somehow be overcome, infringement 
proceedings do not address or even aid the resolution of either the complex contestations that 
underpin principled non-execution, or the structural and political difficulties of rights 
enforcement that underpin dilatory non-execution. It is apposite, however, to start with the 
general difficulty of practicality before moving on to the critiques that map most closely onto 
an understanding of the dynamics of non-execution.  
 
A. Practicality 
 
Our first concern is quite straightforward: Article 46(4) ECHR is simply impractical.  
Article 46(4) ECHR can only be triggered by a vote of at least two thirds of the 
members of the Committee of Ministers following a Contracting Party’s failure to execute a 
judgment after service of an official notice to comply. The super-majority requirement is, no 
doubt, a pragmatic one designed to limit vexatious use of Article 46(4) ECHR and to signify 
that non-execution must reach a stage of grave concern for the Court to be involved in this 
way.  
Even if that unhappy state of affairs were to transpire, however, actually achieving a 
two-thirds vote would be extremely politically challenging. The first challenge is, of course, 
to convince two-thirds of the States’ representatives to agree to refer the case back to the 
Court. That this will ever happen seems a remote possibility to us, particularly when one 
takes into account the nature of the Committee of Ministers. As well as having a role in the 
supervision of judgments, the Committee is a political body ‘where national approaches to 
European problems are discussed on an equal footing and a forum to find collective 
responses to these challenges’. 68  Thus, the Committee is involved in many aspects of 
functioning of the Council of Europe,
69
 and before any decision to try to trigger Article 46(4) 
ECHR would be taken, consideration of the implications of such a move for the Committee’s 
ability to fulfil its broader functions would be required. Certainly, one can foresee that 
infringement proceedings against one of the members of the Council of Europe might ‘cool’ 
dialogue with that same State in respect of other areas of the Council of Europe’s work. 
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Broader institutional dynamics and geopolitical concerns are, thus, likely to impact on 
decisions about whether to use Article 46(4) ECHR in a way that makes calling (not to 
mention winning) a vote seem unlikely.  
A further, and serious, political concern relates to the fact that many European States 
have failed to execute judgments. Although, as outlined above, there are particular concerns 
about nine dilatory States, as well as about the United Kingdom and Azerbaijan, in fact any 
number of States might, conceivably, have infringement proceedings taken against them. For 
an infringement procedure to be initiated it would have to be supported by at least 31 
Contracting Parties, which might themselves face similar infringement procedures in the 
future, potentially dissuading its use in practice. Relatedly, political complications are likely 
to arise in respect of which country is the first to have infringement proceedings taken against 
it. Such a State may well consider the initiation of infringement proceedings to be illegitimate 
on the basis that it is being unfairly targeted by the Committee of Ministers; ‘why us, when 
so many others also fail to execute?’. Certainly, if Article 46(4) ECHR is to be used some 
discernment will be required: we cannot refer all cases of concern to the Court. How, then, is 
political backlash (with the potential to call into question the legitimacy of the Court and the 
Committee) to be avoided? It seems to us that the practical difficulties are, effectively, 
insurmountable in this respect. 
 
B. Futility 
 
Even if, somehow, those practical difficulties could be overcome we would be left with what 
seems to us a fatal flaw in the proposition that Article 46(4) ECHR might be the answer to 
non-execution: its almost certain futility. 
First, and taking into account all of the political challenges outlined above, an Article 
46(4) ECHR proceeding would be an implicit acceptance of ‘defeat’ by the Committee of 
Ministers; by referring the case back to the Court, the Committee accepts that politics has 
failed. As has been observed by Lambert-Abdelgawad, international institutions do not 
readily make manifest their failures in such a way.
70
 Given this, it is likely that infringement 
proceedings would be seen as a measure of penultimate resort (suspension being the measure 
of last resort) so that Article 46(4) ECHR would not be triggered until the non-execution had 
continued for a protracted period of time, calling into question its potential to really assist 
with the realisation of rights. 
In some cases, States have explained non-execution by citing their inability to force 
the national parliament to change national laws or by references to the statements of national 
constitutions. Of course, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties States 
that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty, but this does not resolve the very real practical difficulties that arise where 
domestic legal change is required. No infringement procedure can remove the obstacles to 
execution that the non-executing party is experiencing, and neither does it make the original 
judgment more binding. Those barriers continue to exist, and the judgment was always 
binding. Thus, the infringement proceeding adds little to this standoff in legal terms.  
In addition, one must consider what will happen in respect of the implementation of 
the initial judgment (which is often an incremental process) once Article 46(4) ECHR is 
triggered. It seems likely to us that, even if the respondent State were willing to do something 
(albeit something inadequate to constitute full execution in the view of the Committee of 
Ministers), it will do nothing from the point of initiating Article 46(4) ECHR proceedings to 
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the time when the Court delivers its decision on the infringement proceeding. The likelihood 
is that this would be a somewhat protracted process. Rule 96 of the Rules of Court provides 
that the Grand Chamber must hear requests from the Committee of Ministers for execution to 
be reviewed by the Court. Not only is this challenging on its own (convening the Grand 
Chamber, with its 17 judges, is burdensome given the heavy workload in the Court and the 
associated disruption to the Chambers), but this is just one of an increasing number of types 
of cases that the Grand Chamber is to hear: relinquishments, referrals, and advisory 
opinions
71
 already constitute a heavy burden for this formation of the Court. At present the 
Grand Chamber tends to deal with around twenty cases per year, and proceedings going to 
the Grand Chamber last over five years. Either Article 46(4) ECHR proceedings will fall into 
this long queue, or they will displace cases already waiting to be heard by the Grand 
Chamber. Article 46(4) ECHR proceedings will also be time consuming. Pursuant to Rule 97 
the Court should inform the Committee of Ministers and the parties concerned that they may 
submit written comments on the question referred. Moreover the Court can have an oral 
hearing in the case of infringement proceedings. If we are right that neither the Committee of 
Ministers nor the respondent State will do much (or frankly anything) in terms of 
implementing the judgment while the Grand Chamber proceedings are pending and in train, 
then this is likely to introduce serious delays. How this improves the effectiveness of the 
Court is difficult to discern.  
This is all the more so when one asks a straightforward, but necessary, question in 
respect of using Article 46(4) ECHR to address non-execution: what, if anything, will it 
achieve? The reality is that an Article 46(4) ECHR procedure effectively tells us what we 
already know: that a State has failed to respect a judgment of the Court. If there were 
uncertainty about it, Article 46(3) ECHR—by which the Committee of Ministers asks the 
Court to give a clearer interpretation of its judgment—should be used, although an Article 
46(4) proceeding might be capable of providing an answer in cases of genuine disagreement 
as to whether execution has taken place. Apart from that limited circumstance, however, 
infringement proceedings will not be used unless the Committee of Ministers already knows 
that the State is non-executing, and so what does it add for the Court to reiterate that? 
Moreover, it is also known to the Contracting Party that it fails to execute the judgment 
because the procedure is designed to deal with clear cases of non-execution. The Committee 
of Ministers would first use all other tools of political pressure such as interim resolutions, 
discussions of the case at the meetings of the Committee of Ministers, letters from the head of 
the Committee of Ministers etc. Article 46(4) ECHR is going to be used when all other ways 
of execution has failed as a punishment for non-execution rather than a discursive tool that is 
there to find a solution to a dead end of execution. Moreover, this punishment will be 
toothless as the Court will not be able to impose any sanctions for non-compliance with its 
initial judgment. Article 46(4) ECHR can indeed be used as a hypothetical threat but the 
effects of this threat will quickly fade if it is never used. 
In addition, the formal finding of non-execution does nothing to address the root 
causes of non-execution. If States fail to execute because of either principle or dilatoriness it 
seems unlikely that the scolded State would suddenly see the error of its ways were the Court 
to scold it again, especially after the Committee of Ministers has already unsuccessfully 
attempted to ensure execution. To claim that an adverse finding in an infringement 
proceeding would lead a State to see the error of its ways and then execute its judgment 
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seems, to us, to reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how reputation works in domestic 
and international affairs. 
In a case of principled non-execution, domestic political actors will have made clear 
that their refusal to execute the judgment of the Court relates to something fundamental: to 
the principles of democratic decision-making, or the idea that the State ought not to be 
‘dictated to’, or the proposition that judicial power ought to be subject to democratic will 
determined through an open, deliberative process in Parliament, for example. If this is so, 
then how can a domestic political actor who has so firmly stated the principled nature of her 
opposition to executing the judgment in question retreat from that position just because the 
Court has reiterated the original violation, without losing what is likely to considered an 
unacceptable amount of domestic political reputation and capital? Principled non-execution is 
not resolved by a restatement of the original violation, or by confirmation of non-execution. 
The recalcitrant State here knows that it is in violation of the Convention but either accepts 
and stands by that violation on the basis of the principle it perceives to be in question, or 
argues that its actions ought not to be defined as a violation of the Convention. This is 
decidedly not a standoff that can be resolved through further judicial intervention of the kind 
foreseen by Article 46(4) ECHR. 
As for dilatory States, the fact is that these States’ international reputations have 
already been damaged by the non-execution, which is publicly known, so that it is difficult to 
see what further material or motivating reputational damage a finding of the Court might 
achieve. Rather, it seems to us that all that will be achieved by the use of Article 46(4) ECHR 
in relation to these States is the further depletion of the Court’s resources (by adding to the 
Grand Chamber list), and a redoubling of the enforcement crisis by the production of even 
more un-executed judgments. After all, the judgments delivered as a result of the 
infringement procedure also need to be executed, leading to the spectre of a potentially 
absurd situation where the issue is sent back and forth between the Committee of Ministers 
and the Court and the rights violations in question remain unresolved. 
 
C. Possible Backlash 
 
We have already outlined the potential for the use of Article 46(4) ECHR against some, but 
inevitably not all, non-executing Contracting Parties to have negative effects within the 
dynamics of the Committee of Ministers itself. Beyond that, however, a further potential for 
backlash exists. In a climate in which, in at least some Contracting Parties, there is a deep 
popular scepticism about the Court, involving the Court in the (ultimately political) process 
of execution may well add fuel to the fire of the illegitimacy discourse. It is difficult to see 
how actors who already considered the Court to be illegitimate, interfering and expansionist 
would have their minds changed by infringement proceedings in which the Court might be 
said to have a political or self-interested motivation in reaching one conclusion or another, 
given that it would in some ways be called upon to adjudicate upon the effectiveness of its 
own judgments.   
To take an obvious (but not, we think, unfair) example, one might imagine the 
reaction in the United Kingdom should infringement proceedings be taken in respect of the 
state’s non-execution of the Hirst No 2 and Greens judgments on prisoner voting. ‘Not only’, 
one can imagine the media backlash going, ‘did the European judges try to give rapists, 
murderers and terrorists a vote, but they then told our politicians that we have no right to 
decide for ourselves about who gets to vote in our elections. Stop European judges dictating 
to British politicians’. And what of the political backlash? Although the Prime Minister has 
accepted that she does not believe there is sufficient political will to withdraw from the 
Convention, we should not take for granted that this would always be the case. We have, 
18 
 
indeed, already seen from the Brexit referendum that popular will can be built in support of a 
retreat from international organisations thought to be overreaching into domestic affairs and, 
thus, to ‘take back control’. Is it wholly unreasonable to expect that, having been forced into 
a corner by an infringement proceeding (which the UK would no doubt lose), the UK 
government might find itself with no other realistic political alternative but to make good on 
that threat of withdrawal? Even if not, surely the rhetoric of illegitimacy would only be 
further fuelled, and the critics of the Europe further emboldened, by such an act.  
It is important to recognise that, even within a State such as the UK, which is 
generally a high compliance and internationalist state, the conditions for such a backlash are 
ripe. This is well illustrated by considering the contentious question of the extraterritorial 
application of the Convention. Theresa May has committed that the UK “will never again – 
in any future conflict – let those activist, left-wing human rights lawyers harangue and harass 
the bravest of the brave – the men and women of Britain’s Armed Forces”.72 This passage, 
taken from her first speech to the Conservative Party conference as Prime Minister, was 
clearly referring to the cases in domestic and European courts through which British troops 
have been held accountable for breaches of the Convention in overseas operations. These 
cases all require the extraterritorial application of the Convention following Al Skeini v 
United Kingdom;
73
 a decision that conservative legal observers have derided as one in which 
the Court “retrospectively extended the reach of the ECHR so that it applied to a wide range 
of British military action abroad” and “abandoned [the] long-settled understanding [of 
jurisdiction in Article 1] and instead asserted a new interpretation that turned not primarily on 
territory but on vague ideas about control, public power, and the use of force”.74  
It has become axiomatic among some that ensuring human rights law does not apply 
to British military serving abroad is necessary for the purposes of ‘saving our armed forces 
from defeat by judicial diktat’.75 Partly in response, it has been declared that the planned 
British Bill of Rights (to replace the Human Rights Act 1998) will be expressly territorially 
limited. While this might well succeed in preventing the application of domestic human 
rights law abroad, it would not of course impact on the extraterritorial applicability of the 
Convention as a matter of international law. Thus, applicants may still succeed in securing 
findings of violation against the UK in the ECtHR and quite likely a finding that the lack of 
applicability of domestic human rights law violates Article 13’s guarantee of effective 
remedy. Should that be the case there would be yet another ‘standoff’ in which Strasbourg 
and Westminster fundamentally disagree ‘in principle’, and execution of the general 
measures likely to be ordered would likely be a remote possibility. Should such a situation 
emerge, it is difficult to foresee any positive outcome for the relationship between the Court 
and the UK politico-legal system from an infringement proceeding that might be brought if 
Article 46(4) were to be triggered. Indeed, one can foresee a backlash of substantial 
proportions against the Court instead. 
Thus, in situations of principled non-execution Article 46(4) ECHR proceedings 
would not only fail to achieve execution of the judgment(s) in question, but they may well 
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aggravate existing wounds (not only in the UK, but elsewhere) in a way that has far broader 
implications for the effective protection of the rights guaranteed in the Convention. In the 
context of extended states of emergency in France and Turkey, increasing numbers of 
attempts to undermine human rights through referendum (in, for example, Switzerland and 
Hungary), and global shifts in power towards populist and often authoritarian leaders and 
modes of governance, we must be vigilant about the Convention and its Court. We stand at a 
delicate point; the Convention and its Court still generally command respect and are 
complied with, they continue to drive positive change in rights protection across Europe, and 
indeed to be a ‘beacon of light’ for persons and groups unable to acquire appropriate 
recognition of, and remedy for, rights violations in their domestic legal systems. However, as 
the changing dynamics of non-execution we have outlined in this Article show, the Court and 
Convention continue to stand on somewhat vulnerable foundations, reliant on States’ 
compliance, acceptance of their authority, and ability and willingness to hold one another to 
account. Backlash following infringement proceedings in cases of principled non-execution 
is, thus, a significant concern, and a real risk should we turn to Article 46(4).  
The risk of backlash is, perhaps, somewhat less serious in situations of dilatory non-
execution, but this is simply because, on a very basic level, in many cases commitment to the 
Court and the Convention is either simply rhetorical or, even when bona fide, not 
accompanied by the resources required to give effect to the Convention. Where the State in 
question shows nothing more than rhetorical engagement with the Convention and the Court, 
such as Azerbaijan (to return to our earlier example), infringement proceedings may not 
attract backlash against the Court (where the performance of respect for rights may continue 
as a matter of ‘caviar diplomacy’), but within the Contracting Party itself. We have also seen, 
in that country, the suffocation of the legal profession and NGOs in order, partially, to try to 
cut off the pipeline of cases to Strasbourg in the first place. How infringement proceedings 
could do anything but exacerbate such tendencies is not evident to us. Where a government is 
more concerned with suppressing opposition, maintaining power, and repressing dissent, 
infringement proceedings may simply add fuel to the already blazing fire. In some other 
States with persistent problems of dilatory non-execution, such as Greece for example, 
infringement proceedings will neither produce the resources needed to give effect to the 
rights in question, nor resolve the difficult decisions of prioritisation and resource allocation 
that have to be made where there are competing needs and extremely limited means. Indeed, 
infringement proceedings may well simply make these difficult decisions even more difficult, 
placing politicians and other decision-makers into increasingly tight spots. The pragmatic 
nature of this concern does not rid it of its seriousness or, indeed, the wisdom of accounting 
for it before deciding to turn to infringement proceedings in order to address non-execution. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
It is beyond question that non-execution is a serious problem for the Convention system, and 
that its persistence raises difficulties of effectiveness and legitimacy for the Court and the 
system as a whole. In short: non-execution needs to be addressed for the good, not only of 
individual rights holders in the contracting parties, but also for the system as a whole. 
However, as our characterisation of the dynamics of non-execution and sketch of the types of 
cases under review by the Committee of Minister shows, non-execution properly understood 
is a political rather than a legal problem. Understood in this way, one must ask in a general 
sense whether a legal solution (whether it be Article 46(4) ECHR, or the innovative use of the 
pilot procedure in coming years) can truly address the underlying issues that non-execution 
reveals.  
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Not only are the practicalities of using Article 46(4) ECHR so complex as to make its 
deployment seem unlikely but—and more importantly—the almost certain futility and 
possible backlash that would flow therefrom make this avenue one in which, we argue, 
extreme caution should be displayed. If the Council of Europe is serious about tackling non-
execution, then it must focus its attention on politics. It must take seriously the reality that, in 
some cases and at some times, non-execution is the politically popular and advantageous 
thing for the State to do with an eye to the domestic polity, and that the politics of reputation 
and peer pressure within the Council of Europe are not sufficiently strong to counter the 
domestic political ‘payoff’ of non-execution.  
The Court has already developed techniques of self-restraint that respond, implicitly, 
to some of the claims of illegitimacy that can underpin non-execution,
76
 but it cannot address 
the fundamental refusal in some cases to accept the authority of the Court to make the final 
determination about rights. Achieving that requires hard political and intellectual discussions, 
not infringement proceedings. Should it be decided that Article 46(4) really is to be relied 
upon to address the non-execution challenge in the Court, those discussions will be further 
postponed, the procedure will either prove itself to be unworkable or the Court will be forced 
into an almost impossible position, more and more resources will be absorbed in trying to 
hear Article 46(4) proceedings and in managing the fall out from them, and rights violations 
will ultimately remain without remedy.  
Non-execution is a political problem requiring political solutions. Failure to recognise 
that may well spell ‘mission impossible’ for the system; an outcome that would be desired by 
some States, but disastrous for all European peoples. 
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